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I. Introduction
Taxation is essentially an arena of contestation and negotiation of 
the proper foundations of state wealth and the appropriate means 
of obtaining it.1 As elsewhere, this is the case in the Somali federal 
member state of Puntland, where state authorities are struggling to 
(re)instate governance structures and create comprehensive statehood 
after decades of “governance without government.”2 Increased taxa-
tion of local businesses is an important part of Puntland’s official ambi-
tion to rely less on port taxes and foreign aid. But efforts to increase 
existing taxes and introduce new types of taxation have been met 
with protests and rejection by local traders.3 On November 10, 2013, a 
cyclone devastated the Puntland coast. Approximately 300 people lost 
their lives and 5,000 households (some 30,000 people) were left vulner-
able as a result of significant loss of livestock and lack of shelter, food, 
and safe drinking water. An estimated 23% of camels, 47% of sheep, 
and 52% of goats were lost in the affected areas of Dangooriyo, Ceyl, 
Bandarbeyla, and Caluula.4 The Puntland government cooperated 
with religious leaders (referred to by my interlocutors interchange-
ably as “ulama,” “sheikhs,” “clergy,” and “scholars”) to collect money 
for humanitarian aid and for rebuilding the Midigar bridge between 
Garoowe and Dangooriyo, which had been destroyed by the floods. 
The payments were said to have continued for a period of six months, 
from late 2013 and well into 2014, and to have raised approximately 
US$700.5
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From July to December 2014, I conducted five months of ethno-
graphic fieldwork in Puntland’s capital, Garoowe. I conducted thirty-
five formal interviews; fifteen with fuel traders, six with government 
and municipal officials in the Puntland Ministry of Finance and the 
Garoowe Municipality tax division, two with advisers to the Puntland 
Ministry of Planning and Ministry of Justice, respectively, and eleven 
interviews with a diverse group of owners of small, medium-sized, 
and large businesses in Garoowe.
Besides these formal interviews, I engaged in numerous informal 
conversations with neighbors, relatives, and other Garoowe citizens, 
not only about their thoughts on business, taxation, and the state, but 
on all aspects of life in Garoowe, such as identity, cultural and religious 
practices, and everyday challenges and future aspirations.
Based on this data, I explore the hybridized collection of public 
funds following the cyclone of November 2013. I show how images 
of state are constituted through practices of hybrid governance and 
the mobilization of the historically significant state repertoire of self-
reliance. 
In contemporary studies on state authority, the mediated, negoti-
ated, or “hybrid” state has become a widely used framework to discuss 
empirical or “real governance.”6 This framework broadens our under-
standing of authority to include a wide variety of non-state actors. It 
also aims to overcome conceptualizations of state authority that mea-
sure African states only by what they fail to do. In this article, I employ 
the hybrid terminology in order to capture the way state and religious 
authorities joined together to collect and manage public revenue in the 
aftermath of the cyclone in Puntland. Taxation is particularly central to 
our understanding of state-society relations and represents a central 
prerogative by, and claim to, state authority.7 For that reason, taxation 
becomes an important lens for studying authority.
The vast literature on taxation and authority tends to focus either 
on (1) the links between tax bargaining and the development of gover-
nance structures, often understood as democratically accountable state 
institutions, or (2) how non-state authorities claim authority through 
taxation in areas of weak statehood. In this article, I challenge the 
proposition that accountability and local legitimacy is necessarily the 
outcome of conventional tax bargaining between (state) authorities 
and citizens/taxpayers.
I wish to contribute to the literature on hybridity and taxation with 
a focus on ideological practices and narratives worked and reworked 
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to (re)create an image of the state able to support locally acceptable 
tax claims. Traditional tax bargaining is not the only avenue for state 
authorities to create such images. Like non-state authorities they may 
appropriate or mimic historical state repertoires and/or create new 
governance and taxation structures.
The case of the Puntland cyclone relief efforts shows how hybrid-
ized modes of revenue collection can serve as part of an effort to consti-
tute and (re)create an image of the state as a powerful and self-reliant 
entity. In other words, the involvement of non-state authorities in state 
governance structures may in fact strengthen claims to state authority 
by increasing the acceptability and perceived accountability of tax col-
lections. 
The article is divided into four parts. First, I introduce the theoreti-
cal foundations of my discussion of taxation and hybridity. Second, I 
introduce the historical background of political systems, self-reliance 
repertoires, and religious authority in Puntland. In the third section, 
I discuss local notions of accountability and legitimacy, and the ideo-
logical work done through practices of taxation and hybridization. 
Finally, I sum up the findings and conclusions of the study. 
II. Taxation and Hybridity in Puntland
A. Formal and Informal Taxation 
The ability of a government to collect taxes is a classic indicator of 
generic state capacity.8 Following from this is the proposition that 
improving the revenue process is a route to more effective state build-
ing.9 The overall argument of this literature is that, “the modern, repre-
sentative state emerged as the result of negotiations between autocratic 
governments who needed tax revenues in order to survive inter-state 
conflicts on the one hand, and citizens who were only willing to con-
sent to taxation in exchange for greater government accountability on 
the other.”10
As a result, accountability and more particularly democratic insti-
tutions are seen as primarily resulting from bargaining over tax poli-
cies and budgets.11 In this light, large amounts of international aid, 
earnings from natural resources, and state income generated through 
sources other than direct taxation are viewed as undermining values of 
democracy and good governance.12
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In recent years, ethnographically based studies of the links between 
taxation and governance have explored a wide variety of settings and 
institutional formats. Common to these studies is a focus on how non-
state actors claim authority through informal types of taxation in areas 
of weak statehood. This literature is built on the basic assumption that, 
“public authority is built on a modicum of mutual recognition: on the 
one hand, those claiming public authority recognize the moral values 
and the norms of wider populations; while on the other, their claims 
are recognized as legitimate by those at whom they are directed.”13 
Roitman argues that with formal state actors engaging in informal 
and illicit activities alongside informal (non-state) actors contributing 
to the redistribution of wealth and exercising authority on the bor-
der, the distinction between formal and informal forms of authority 
becomes irrelevant.14 Meagher, on the other hand, states that there is 
a need to sharpen rather than blur the distinction between formal and 
informal governance, and to distinguish between legitimate and ille-
gitimate types of governance.15
In the Somali territories it makes little sense to distinguish between 
formal and informal businesses. Due to long-term state absence in the 
area, all businesses have been made informal.16 Certain informal rates 
may have been paid to alternative figures of authority, but at least from 
1991 to 1998 in the case of Puntland, no state structures were in place 
to collect taxes or be in charge of  official registration. And today, even 
official state taxes may in some ways be considered informal, while 
informal payments are sometimes considered taxation.
Following the establishment of Puntland, at first as an autonomous 
region and later as a federal state within Somalia, steps have been 
taken toward formalization. The official tax framework of Puntland 
state was revised in 2013–2014, and efforts were continually made 
within municipal and state authorities to increase practices of registra-
tion and to enhance the effectiveness of tax collection practices.17
Under these circumstances, formalization is best viewed as a con-
tinuum,18 and formalization is an ongoing process within all sectors 
of Puntland society. Some businesses are officially registered but are 
weary of taxation and try their best to avoid it. Others are unregistered 
but pay taxes on a day-to-day basis, such as street-side meat and veg-
etable sellers in Garoowe.19 Formalization in terms of business registra-
tion,20 as well as increased taxation,21 has been an officially formulated 
priority for recent Puntland administrations in order to increase tax 
revenues and minimize dependence on port taxes and international 
aid.22
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However, taxation in Puntland is still known to take irregular and 
somewhat sporadic forms. The Ministry of Finance is responsible for 
collecting port taxes, which account for approximately 80% of state rev-
enues.23 The Garoowe Municipality collects sales tax from registered 
and unregistered businesses and marketplaces, as well as “offloading” 
and “transit” taxes from two checkpoints at the main entry points on 
the road from Boosaaso and Galkacyo.24 In 2006, hotels in Boosaaso 
were targeted for a local and sector-specific tax25 and in 2014 fuel trad-
ers were the primary targets of the locally implemented parking tax in 
Garoowe.26 In the latter case, the tax was discontinued after less than a 
year due to pressure from fuel traders.
Due to the difficulties associated with formalizing businesses and 
state practices, localized and sector-specific taxation has been preva-
lent, and official state actors are collecting informal (illicit), yet locally 
accepted, “district development” taxes from formal checkpoints along 
the Boosaaso-Garoowe road.27 Concomitantly, changes in the for-
mally formulated and nationally implemented sales tax were met with 
skepticism and refusal among many traders in Garoowe.28 All in all, 
the boundaries between formal taxation and informal payments are 
blurred, and local acceptance of taxation is not dependent on the for-
mal status of the tax. 
The 2013 cyclone relief effort in essence represents a special levy 
imposed as a response to the natural disaster. Yet, in light of the 
described general state of taxation in Puntland, this levy was perceived 
by my interlocutors as a tax like many others. The main difference was 
the involvement of religious authority figures, leading to increased 
trust and the hope of proper management of the collected funds in the 
eyes of many citizens. 
B. Hybrid Governance
In recent years there has been a growing literature on hybrid gover-
nance, starting with Boege and colleagues, who acknowledged that, 
“‘The state’ is only one actor among others, and ‘state order’ is only 
one of a number of orders claiming to provide security, frameworks for 
conflict regulation and social services.”29
From this acknowledgement grew an extensive literature on hybrid-
ity within peace and security,30 governance,31 and service delivery,32 as 
well as related literatures on mediated and negotiated forms of state-
hood.33
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The hybrid governance literature has been criticized, on the one 
hand, for reproducing the binaries and distinctions between “state” 
and “traditional” sources of authority that it originally developed 
to criticize.34 On the other hand, Meagher raises the objection that a 
clearer distinction between state and non-state actors and sources of 
authority is needed in order to avoid undue celebration of illegitimate 
forms of authority.35 Despite these critiques, the literature on hybridity 
provides a framework to explore and understand empirical phenom-
ena that shape governance structures in many parts of the world.
In reality, it is not always clear to what extent multiple sources of 
authority have merged or whether they merely coexist as “different 
juridical mechanisms that apply to identical situations.”36 In the lat-
ter case, we might refer to the situation as one of legal pluralism.37 In 
the Somali territories, including Puntland, instances of both hybrid 
governance and legal pluralism are found. However, as described by 
Moe and Albrecht, the simultaneity of discourse and practice points 
to the understanding that, “[t]he state or tradition never just is, and as 
has been well documented certainly never in isolated, uncontaminated 
spaces. Rather, they are continuously enacted and re-enacted, and in 
these processes numerous sources of authority are drawn in and upon 
at the same time.”38
Instances of hybrid governance and legal pluralism have been more 
the norm than the exception in the Somali territories since colonial 
times and, even more significantly, since the outbreak of the civil war 
in 1991. Statehood in terms of basic service provision, local justice pro-
vision, and collection of funds for emergency relief, has almost exclu-
sively been in the hands of local traditional authorities, private actors, 
and international organizations since that time.39 In recent years, Punt-
land authorities have increasingly formulated plans to reduce legal 
pluralism and, in turn, increase hybrid governance. One example is the 
elaborate plan to establish Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) insti-
tutions, in which Shari’a courts and clan elder xeer settlements were 
to be brought under joint administration at the Ministry of Justice. 
With the support of UNDP, an ADR house was opened in Garoowe 
in December 2014.40 Another example is the increased involvement 
of state authorities in administering construction projects funded by 
international organizations.41
The third example is the collaboration between state and religious 
authorities in the collection of public funds, as explored in this arti-
cle. Previously, these two types of collection might have proceeded 
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in parallel or the collection would have been left exclusively to the 
figures of religious authority. Yet in 2013, the Puntland government 
initiated a collaboration with the ulama in the collection and manage-
ment of funds for emergency and rebuilding efforts. On November 
12, 2014, the President of Puntland, Abdiweli Mohamed Ali ‘Gaas,’ 
nominated a Disaster Management and Rescue Committee, consisting 
of four ministers, two deputy ministers, and six representatives of reli-
gious authority. This committee was given the mandate to act “as the 
only government designated body … in charge of organizing and dis-
patching [emergency] relief to affected people on behalf of the govern-
ment.”42 According to my interlocutors, the board set the fixed sums to 
be collected from each business depending on its size,43 and decided 
on the tasks to be carried out as well as the organization to take charge 
of each step and each area.44
The campaign for funds combined two modes of collection very 
familiar to Puntland citizens: the morally obligated voluntary sadaqah, 
collected through mosques and nationwide networks, and the “fixed 
sum” mandatory taxation, collected from businesses and checkpoints. 
This hybrid arrangement led the collection to be perceived (at least by 
parts of the citizenry) as a state induced tax, carrying the moral back-
ing of the ulama.
Boege and colleagues describe the hybrid governance model as a 
strategy that some states deliberately pursue in order to strengthen 
state capacities and legitimacy.45 By not trying to impose its suprem-
acy, but acknowledging the strengths of local institutions and working 
with them, state authorities may be able to provide a harmonizing 
framework. Importantly, in the case of the cyclone relief effort, part of 
this harmonizing framework took the form of an ideological appeal 
made by religious authorities, mobilizing the familiar state repertoire 
of self-reliance. In this way, to execute “core functions of government 
and mediate relations between local communities and state,”46 the reli-
gious authorities in Puntland support state legitimacy by participating 
in a narrative of the self-reliant state.
Discourses or public narratives of state practices, such as corrup-
tion or taxation, fulfill the dual role of allowing people to symbolically 
construct the state and constitute themselves as citizens.47 Therefore, 
these narratives are central to understanding relations between social 
groups and the state. In this article, I explore two sets of narratives: one 
emanating from figures of authority in order to legitimize practices of 
hybridization and taxation; the other narrated by citizens and taxpay-
Kirstine Strøh Varming
Bildhaan  Vol. 19
8
ers, explicating their views of state, taxation, and hybridity. I use these 
public narratives of taxation as a way to explore the quest to constitute 
an image of a self-reliant state in Puntland.
In the following, I explore the backgrounds of the various regis-
ters or repertories of statehood and legitimacy in Somalia and Punt-
land. I introduce the institutional arrangements of Puntland state and 
its uneasy relationship with south-central Somalia. Finally, I go on to 
show the historical relevance of the self-reliance repertoire as well as 
the historical relationship between the state and religious authorities. 
III. “Self-Reliance,” Religious Authority,  
and Legitimacy in Somalia
At a community conference held in Garoowe in May 1998, an interim 
charter was formulated with basic provisions for the creation of the 
legislative, judicial, and executive arms of a Puntland state govern-
ment. A transitional administration, comprising a president and vice 
president, a nine-member cabinet, and a sixty-six-member House of 
Representatives, was sworn in on August 1, 1998, officially declaring 
Puntland an autonomous regional administration within Somalia.48 
The London conference in 2012 and the signing of the new federal 
constitution marked the end of a long line of transitional governments 
for Somalia and accorded Puntland the new status of federal member 
state.49
Puntland continues to occupy an uneasy position, balancing 
between strengthening local state formation and securing a position 
within the Federal State of Somalia. According to Smaker and John-
son, this has slowed down internal processes of state formation and 
hampered the development of increasingly democratic institutions in 
comparison to state trajectories of neighboring Somaliland.50
The Darood-Majeerteen clan constitutes the vast majority of Punt-
land’s estimated 4.3 million population, and particularly the three sub-
clans of the Mohamud Saleban dominate state politics.51 Elections in 
Puntland are conducted on the basis of clan representation, but have 
been praised for their peaceful and fair nature. As described by Men-
khaus, multi-party elections may in fact threaten the fragile security 
and stability.52 The lack of democratic institutions means that account-
ability is not achieved through the ability of citizens to directly vote 
out the government. Local understanding of accountability under 
these circumstances relies more on the ability to trust that the collected 
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funds will reach their intended targets and not be appropriated for 
personal interests. As argued by Meagher, these local understandings 
are also influenced by fiscal relationships during previous eras, both 
colonial and post-colonial.53
As we shall see, a strong discourse of self-reliance, coupled with state 
authorities with no direct democratic accountability to the population 
and heavy dependence on aid and international loans, has shaped past 
Somali experiences of statehood. The concept of self-reliance has been 
prevalent during both colonial and post-colonial rule. Each colony and 
post-colonial state has strived, although often unsuccessfully, to collect 
enough internal revenue to cover its own expenses.54
Within development research, the self-reliance concept came to the 
fore in the 1980s and it still generally refers to a strategy to increase 
autonomy and minimize vulnerability and dependence. On a national 
scale, this includes diminishing reliance on economic, political, and 
military support from other nations as well as international agencies.55 
The idea of self-reliance was heavily drawn upon by the Siyaad Barre 
military regime, although in practical terms Somalia’s economic and 
military dependency increased during this period.56
Mohamed Siyaad Barre took power in Mogadishu in 1969 in a mili-
tary coup, following only nine years of Somali independence. During 
Siyaad Barre’s reign, lasting until 1991, the image of a strong state was 
partly portrayed to the population through the regime’s focus on “self-
reliance.” This imperative was enacted through the nationalization of 
industrial production, banking, and wholesale trade. During the 1970s, 
the Siyaad Barre government expanded from nine to twenty-six min-
istries in order to accommodate the growth of the public sector. In 
1975– 1978, the public sector was in charge of 96% of investments, 80% 
of employment, and 85% of wages and salaries in Somalia.57
Meanwhile, industrial and agricultural production stagnated, 
despite investments in local production. This resulted in high levels 
of food imports and reliance on foreign aid. While aid accounted for 
approximately 30% of GDP, Somalia’s outstanding debts amounted 
to US$1.4 billion in early 1985.58 Another reason for these high levels 
of foreign aid was the “structural defects of the taxes and … the inef-
ficient operation and administrative weaknesses of the tax system.”59 
Although tax revenues were increasing throughout the 1970s and 
1980s, their contribution to the total state expenditure remained low, 
and reliance on customs tax accounted for more than 50% of the total.60 
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Despite the financial difficulties, the regime continued to spend a 
large part of the insufficient national resources on the unproductive 
domains of defense and general administration. In the late 1980s, only 
20% of Somalia’s recurrent expenditure was allocated to economic and 
social activities, compared to 40% allocated by other low-income coun-
tries on the continent.61
Military budgets were an important part of the narrative of self-
reliance. Military parades were used to vividly display the strength 
of the state to the populace and to external spectators. Military bud-
gets in Puntland today are similarly disproportionate in the limited 
state budget. It was reported that in 2014–2015 approximately 60% of 
the Puntland state budget (US$21.6 million out of US$36 million) was 
spent on security, most of which was made up of salaries for the secu-
rity forces.62
Considering Siyaad Barre’s ideological focus on self-reliance, the 
heavy reliance on foreign loans, aid, and military support is quite para-
doxical. As Mubarak concludes, “Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the 
authoritarian government exaggerated and fabricated its development 
achievements while censoring and aggressively discouraging any anal-
ysis or opinion that might have exposed the myths.”63 In other words, 
the narrative of a militarily strong and self-reliant state was used to 
mask the reality of the political practices of dependency.64 In this light, 
it is interesting that several interlocutors in Puntland expressed a sense 
of nostalgia for the strong leadership and state power of the Siyaad 
Barre era. Despite the lingering image of the Barre regime as an exam-
ple of strong state governance (as opposed to the current Puntland 
government), there are a number of parallels between the two. This 
includes a small and unstable tax base as well as disproportionate mili-
tary expenditure. More interestingly, it also includes a narrative focus 
on self-reliance, which, on closer inspection, proves to be more rhetori-
cal than genuine. This topic plays an important role in the following 
discussion of hybrid taxation. But first, I will introduce the historical 
background of religious authority in Somalia and Puntland. 
A. Religion and State 
While the self-reliance repertoire represents the revival of a histori-
cally significant “language of stateness,”65 the involvement of religious 
authorities in state governance represents a clear shift from the very 
secular regime of “scientific communism” under Siyaad Barre.
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From 1969 to 1990, the Barre regime was hostile to any public politi-
cal assertions of Islamic agendas.66 Ten ulama, who openly condemned 
the new Family Code, were executed in January 1975, and the govern-
ment orchestrated a campaign against all those “religiously backward-
oriented” people who were siding against “progress.”67 In the early 
history of Puntland the prominent Islamic movement, Al-Itihaad, was 
on oppositional terms with Abdullahi Yusuf and the Somali Salvation 
Democratic Front (SSDF), just as they had opposed Barre’s regime. 
However, the involvement of religious individuals and organizations 
in governing and funding certain services took hold in Puntland under 
Abdullahi Yusuf’s presidency nonetheless.68
To draw an exhaustive picture of the various religious authority 
figures in Puntland would prove a daunting task. As described by 
Marchal, there are numerous organizations and groupings with differ-
ent yet overlapping interests and sympathies.69 No doubt historically 
Al-Itihaad Al-Islami (Al-Itihaad) has been the most influential since it 
emerged in the 1980s. Al-Itihaad “was comprised mainly of educated 
young men who had studied or worked in the Middle East. They came 
to the conclusion that the only way to rid Somalia of the corruption, 
repression and tribalism of the Barre years was via political Islam.”70
The organization that was most formally engaged in the hybrid 
arrangement of tax collection for the 2013 cyclone relief was Al-Min-
haaj. This is a relatively new local organization that operates in all 
regions of Puntland. The organization has been at the forefront of 
the religious authorities’ involvement in Puntland political affairs. In 
December 2013, just before the elections scheduled for January 2014, 
Al-Minhaaj hosted a five-day religious seminar, culminating in a 
21-point declaration, signed by fifteen prominent local Islamic schol-
ars. The declaration primarily contained reminders and suggestions 
for the prospective legislators on how to uphold the Islamic principles 
of truthfulness, trustworthiness, and working “for the greater good” in 
all aspects of campaigning and holding office.71
The specific name and affiliations of this organization did not 
appear to be of much concern to the citizens and taxpayers with whom 
I discussed the hybrid taxation arrangements. Not a single one of them 
mentioned any particular organization in relation to the collection 
of funds. Only the general terms of ulama, sheikhs, or scholars were 
used. Only when I went to interview one of the sheikhs who had been 
involved in the management of the funds did I find out that it was 
representatives of Al-Minhaaj that served on the Disaster Management 
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and Rescue Committee. Part of the reason for this is probably that gen-
eralized appeals for funds were made in different mosques and other 
gatherings and therefore were not associated with any specific group.
In Somalia and Puntland significant hybridization has taken place 
between business elites and religious authorities since the onset of 
the civil war. Ahmad and Marchal both describe this as a develop-
ment arising from the need of the economic elite to uphold a stable 
and secure business environment. This led them to support and fund 
Islamic institutions, like shari’a courts.72
Carrier and Lochery describe how religion has come to play an 
increasingly important role in the business environment among 
Somalis in Kenya, not because of the need for security or justice, but 
because of the trust networks it engenders and as a way to bridge 
clan interests.73 Ahmad also explains, “Islamic law provides a com-
mon set of rules, norms, and beliefs that can reduce uncertainty and 
increase trust.”74 Similarly, the ulama themselves and several taxpayers 
in Garoowe explained that the main reason for the religious authorities 
to be involved in collecting funds for the cyclone relief efforts was to 
engender trust that the money would reach the intended beneficia-
ries.75
Early governments in Somalia and Puntland were committed to 
strictly secular agendas, but it is clear that today there is a strong iden-
tification with an Islamic moral code and identity within the popula-
tion. This came to the fore in the initial support and enthusiasm for the 
idea of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) taking over Mogadishu in 2006. 
Initially, many sheikhs and other citizens in Puntland supported the 
ICU. Quickly, however, the ICU gained a reputation among Puntland-
ers that they represented the interests of only one clan and that they 
had uncritically embraced previously notorious warlords now adding 
sheikh to their name.76
This led to a new message spread by the ulama in Puntland: We 
need to stay away from these Islamic courts, they are not Islamic. This 
message intensified as the Islamic Courts Union dissolved and Al-
Shabaab began its violent fight against the Somali government and the 
international community. An interlocutor based in Nairobi concluded, 
“So since that time, the ulama of Puntland have become real Puntland-
ers. They used to be against divisions and the different regions, but 
now they are more strong, and they are becoming strong forces in the 
federal system.”77
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Whether motivated by economic interests, the wish to move beyond 
clannism, a genuine upsurge in religious awareness, or perhaps more 
pertinently, a combination of all of these factors, religious identity 
and organizations have increased in importance throughout the years 
of weak or non-existent state governance. Saggiomo describes how 
Islamic charities in South Somalia have the capacity to behave as a 
consolidated institution in a stateless environment.78 This capacity is 
in part due to the ability of the religious authorities to collect funds 
through the well formulated religious obligations of mandatory zakah 
and voluntary sadaqah, combined with the trust they enjoy from the 
population.
If we return to the case of the hybridized collection of funds for 
cyclone relief in 2013, the involvement of the sheikhs was a prerequisite 
for many business owners to pay the extra contribution. In response to 
a question of whether the money collected from the business commu-
nity was paid directly to the government, the owner of a large business 
responded, “Oh no! No one would pay them directly (Laughing).”79
Another prominent businessman in Garoowe elaborated on the 
feeling of mistrust towards the way state actors were managing the 
finances: “we know that they don’t have money, so we must pay some. 
And always the private sector is not willing to pay so much, because 
they know that funds are not managed properly, so transparency, how 
they manage, is always in question.”80 Both of these representatives of 
powerful business interests in Garoowe came into regular contact with 
state authorities in their daily work. They expressed a grave mistrust 
in the ability of these authorities to competently manage public funds.
The sheikhs involved in the collection of funds, as well as several of 
the contributing citizens, confirmed that trust was the main reason that 
the religious authorities got involved in hybrid tax collection arrange-
ments. One sheikh simply stated, “it is trust based in terms of collect-
ing money, so that was the part of the ulama.”81
B. Hybridity as Self-Reliance: Imagining the State in Puntland 
I was first introduced to the repertoire of self-reliance when an adviser 
to the Puntland Ministry of Planning told me how the Puntland gov-
ernment had denied access to a team of INGO-based researchers. The 
researchers were supposed to carry out an extensive household survey, 
but they had insisted on bringing their own security (possibly from 
the international AMISOM forces). This was firmly rejected by the 
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Puntland government, which had insisted that local Puntland forces 
were perfectly capable of providing security for the delegation. For 
this reason, the adviser told me, no household survey had been con-
ducted in Puntland in recent years.82
The repertoire of self-reliance was drawn upon by Puntland state 
actors, but also strongly by two of the sheikhs who had participated in 
the hybrid taxation efforts. Besides accentuating their own role in the 
relief efforts, they also emphasized the self-reliance of the Puntland 
and Somali people: “About 26,000 shoats [sheep and goats] have been 
contributed in total … 90% have been bought by the ulama with that 
contributed money. That money was collected by Somalis! Nobody 
else!”83 In a similar vein, the report written by Al-Minhaaj highlights: 
“All activities implemented by Al-minhaj [sic] were done through local 
funds.”84
The narrative of self-reliance resonated with the population. Only 
one of the Garoowe business owners mentioned any contribution from 
international organizations in relation to the relief and reconstruction 
efforts following the cyclone. According to him, “the government has 
come with the initiative and arranged a meeting with the business peo-
ple. They tell them: we are building this broken bridge. We pay 30%, 
and we get 20% from the organizations … Then the rest should be paid 
by society.”85 In the minds of other contributors, the relief efforts were 
paid for by the joint collection efforts of state and religious authorities.
According to a representative of Al-Minhaaj, the International Com-
mittee of the Red Cross (ICRC) had been involved in the second phase 
of the relief effort, when the affected population was provided with 
food. At a meeting in Dangooriyo between the government, the schol-
ars, and the ICRC, “they have divided the affected areas into 12 zones. 
Al-Minhaaj took responsibility of seven areas, the ICRC of the remain-
ing five.”86 When asked about international participation in the other 
phases, he stated, “The third phase [restocking flocks of livestock] was 
particularly for Al-Minhaaj, just supported by the government, who 
were giving trucks, vaccinations and the like. Later on other NGOs 
and charities have joined: Care International and Qadar Charity. But 
the extent of their help was very small. Then phase four [rebuilding 
schools and other community essentials] is only Al-Minhaaj.”87
Later, as I was reading through international reports regarding the 
cyclone, it became clear that international organizations had played a 
much more substantial role than had been expressed in local narratives 
surrounding the relief effort. A large part of the contribution, which 
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the scholars and the business owners had attributed to Puntland state 
authorities, like medical care and vaccinations, was financed by the 
FAO, WHO, ICRC, and others.88
By actively “editing out” the contributions of the international com-
munity, the religious authorities engage the self-reliance narrative. 
This illustrates how past repertoires of a state may be mobilized by 
state and non-state authorities for purposes of legitimation.89 Despite 
the shortcomings of the Siyaad Barre regime, for a great number of 
people it still represents an image of “a working state,” the strength of 
which has not been achieved by any government or figure of authority 
in the Somali territories since the outbreak of the civil war. In addition, 
the image of the self-reliant state, not needing the support of UNISOM 
forces and ideally relying on tax revenues rather than international 
funding, is still a powerful idea, featuring lavishly in Puntland state 
discourse. This was clearly seen in various media campaigns and on 
the numerous stickers and billboards across Garoowe with messages 
such as: “The state is a tree that grows through the taxes of the citi-
zens.”90
Fuel traders produced the majority of my formal interview material. 
The reason for this overrepresentation is the interesting negotiations 
of taxation and regulation playing out between the Garoowe munici-
pal authorities and the fuel traders at the time of my fieldwork. This 
group of Garoowe business owners represents diverse clan and inter-
est groups and they differ widely in their relation to, and ideas about, 
the Puntland state. They do, however, tend to agree about being skep-
tical of taxation, particularly around the time in question, when the 
parking tax was specifically targeting their businesses and many felt 
their livelihoods were threatened by new regulatory measures.91
Responses to the collaboration between state and religious authori-
ties were generally positive, even within the group of tax-weary fuel 
traders. One fuel trader expressed delight that different sectors of gov-
ernment were able to work together: “Whether they are government 
representatives, religious scholars or whatever, they are all part of soci-
ety, and it is their duty to make society work.”92 In fact, according to an 
Al-Minhaaj representative, the collaboration was sufficiently success-
ful to encourage a similar joint collection for drought-affected areas in 
Gedo region in 2014.93
The strategy of hybridization may, however, come at a price. By 
associating so closely with state authorities, religious authorities run 
the risk of undermining their own legitimacy.94 It was narrated to me 
Kirstine Strøh Varming
Bildhaan  Vol. 19
16
during fieldwork how specific clan elders in Puntland had lost respect 
and legitimacy as figures of authority through associating too closely 
with representatives of the international community. Meetings with 
such representatives were considered appropriate only for lower-level 
elders. Consequently, this high-level clan elder had been treated as 
such ever since.95 Similar stories regarding elders associated with colo-
nial authorities were also told.96 Seeing how such loss of legitimacy 
has empirical precedence in the Somali territories and even locally 
in Puntland, this is a realistic scenario. If hybrid arrangements like 
the one described in this article were to become more common and 
increasingly institutionalized, this could potentially lead to the under-
mining of the localized authority and legitimacy underpinning the 
arrangements. 
IV. Conclusion
Whether the experience of increased acceptance of the 2013 hybrid-
ized taxation effort will lead to a further institutionalization of the 
relationship between religious authorities and Puntland state authori-
ties remains an open question. Similarly, we can only guess as to the 
outcomes of such institutionalization and whether the acceptability 
of hybrid taxation extends beyond an emergency-based temporary 
appeal. This case study has, however, produced three important points 
for the study of the link between taxation and state authority in Soma-
lia and beyond. 
First, the ability of the historical state repertoire of self-reliance 
to capture the imagination of authority figures and citizens alike is 
remarkable, considering the contrast between this image and the 
empirical reality of political practices of dependency, both in Siyaad 
Barre’s Somalia and in current Puntland. This goes to show the impor-
tance of the concept of the image of the state, and the way citizens 
symbolically construct the state and their own place in it through nar-
ratives.
Second, we have seen how practices of taxation represent essential 
important parts of the quest to constitute and (re)create the “myth” 
or image of the state as the primary figure of authority. Taxation as 
the “prerogative of the state” represents an important state practice, 
constituting a mutual recognition between state and citizens. As such, 
and as the backbone of the image of self-reliance, practices of taxation 
constitute a critical ideological battleground of statehood. 
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Third, the Puntland cyclone relief case study demonstrates how the 
hybrid governance arrangement with religious authorities contributed 
to increased acceptance of, and compliance with, tax collection. Fur-
thermore, by drawing explicitly on the powerful state repertoire of 
self-reliance, religious authorities contributed to the constitution and 
(re)creation of the image of the self-reliant Puntland state. Thus, in a 
somewhat paradoxical fashion, we may say that practices of hybrid-
ization can in fact support the ideological work of state authorities to 
appear as the primary figures of authority.
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